Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit by Gildin, Gary S.
Volume 40 Issue 3 Article 6 
1995 
Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Gary S. Gildin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary S. Gildin, Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 577 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/6 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1995]
APPELLATE DETERMINACY: THE SENTENCING
PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
© PROFESSOR GARY S. GILDIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE sentencing of a criminal defendant is the culmination of
society's endeavor to provide security to the citizenry from the
vexing, and perhaps inexorable, problem of crime.' Different sen-
tencing structures may be devised to serve an array of purposes,
including retribution, incapacitation, deterrence of the defendant
and others, and rehabilitation of the offender.2 The genealogy of
sentencing in the United States is an object lesson in the pendulum
theory of history. The principal historic vacillation has been be-
tween adoption of retribution, or of rehabilitation, as the leading
edge of sentencing policy.
The United States has experienced three primary epochs of
sentencing philosophy and may well be in the nascent phase of a
fourth generation.3 Prior to the late nineteenth century, the princi-
*Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law, B.A., University of Wiscon-
sin, J.D., Stanford Law School. This article is an expanded version of a lecture
delivered at the Fifty-Sixth Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit on April 3,
1995. The author expresses his gratitude to Barbara Rittenger and Peter Garcia
for their invaluable assistance in research for this article.
1. [C]rime is embedded in the culture - and in this particular culture,
and at this particular time. The situation is organic to society; it is part of
the very cell structure, the nucleus. It is like a virus that seizes control of
some part of the organism and its genetic structure; and cannot be de-
stroyed with any of our present instruments of cure.
Of course, there are great pressures on the criminal justice system -
pressures to do something, to provide some relief. The frantic activity of
the eighties, which continues into the nineties - the furious building of
prisons, the stiff laws, the cries for more, more, more in the way of pun-
ishment - what has the upshot been? The effect on crime:
imperceptible.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 460 (1993).
. 2. See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(discussing various sentencing principles); see aso ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF
SENTENCING § 2:1, at 17-19 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that sentencing theories of intim-
idation, indignation, elimination, incapacitation, reformation, disapprobation, ex-
piation, retaliation, retribution and education are embraced within rationales of
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation or retribution); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & Aus-
TIN W. SCoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 23-26 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that theories of pun-
ishment are (1) prevention, (2) restraint, (3) rehabilitation, (4) deterrence, (5)
education, and (6) retribution).
3. For a detailed recitation of the history of sentencing, see generally SANDRA
(577)
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pal aim of sentencing, to the extent articulated, was retribution.4
Punishments were determinate; persons convicted were sentenced
to and served the full term of incarceration established by the
legislature. 5
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed the
ascendancy of rehabilitation as the chief function of the criminal
sentence. Legislatures promulgated indeterminate sentencing
schemes to facilitate rehabilitation of the offender:
Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly al-
ways gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide
whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how
long, whether restraint, such as probation, should be im-
posed instead of imprisonment or fine. This indetermi-
nate-sentencing system was supplemented by the
utilization of parole, by which an offender was returned to
society under the "guidance and control" of a parole
officer.
Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were
based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed prob-
able, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to
rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk
that he [or she] would resume criminal activity upon his
[or her] return to society. It obviously required the judge
and the parole officer to make their respective sentencing
and release decisions upon their own assessments of the
offender's amenability to rehabilitation. As a result, the
SHANE-DuBow ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CON-
TENT AND EFFECT 1-12 (National Institute ofJustice 1985) [hereinafter SENTENCING
REFORM] (giving historical overview of sentencing and punishment); CAMPBELL,
supra note 2, §§ 1:1-1:3, at 1-15 (detailing western traditions, eighteenth and nine-
teenth century developments and modern trends in sentencing).
4. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978) (noting that prior to
late nineteenth century, retribution and punishment were primary purposes of in-
carceration); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (noting
rigidity of fixed penalties and movement away from retribution as primary goal of
punishment). Punishment in colonial times was married in large part to religion.
"Sinners were to be punished and brought back into the fold." FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 31. Rather than utilizing imprisonment as the norm, punishments were
public and were designed "to teach a lesson, so that the sinful sheep would want to
get back to the flock." Id. at 37.
Following the American Revolution, penitentiaries were employed to punish
the offender, with rehabilitation acknowledged to be a secondary by-product of
incarceration. Id. at 77-82; CAMPBELL, supra note 2, § 1:2, at 7; SENTENCING RE-
FORM, supra note 3, at 2-3.
5. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45; see also Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 (alluding to "rigidly
fixed punishments" once used in sentencing).
[Vol. 40: p. 577
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court and the officer were in positions to exercise, and
usually did exercise, very broad discretion. 6
The third era of United States sentencing philosophy began in
the late 1960s and early 1970s spurred by cries for a return to deter-
minate sentencing, with retribution rather than rehabilitation as
the dominant rationale. 7 The attack on the indeterminate/rehabil-
itative model rested in part upon empirical data suggesting that ef-
forts to reform convicts had failed to ameliorate recidivism.8
Opposing political forces further contributed to the demise of the
former system. Conservatives lobbied against undue leniency in the
actual time served by offenders and called for increasingly retribu-
tive sentences. 9 The political left criticized the disparity in
sentences, often based upon the race of the defendant, that re-
sulted from judicial discretion. 10 At the federal level, Congress, in
6. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (citation omitted); see
also Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 ("Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of
the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become impor-
tant goals of criminal jurisprudence."). Congress, in the legislative history to the
1984 Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, stated:
The sentencing provisions of current law were originally based on a
rehabilitation model in which the sentencing judge was expected to sen-
tence a defendant to a fairly long term of imprisonment. The defendant
was eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of his term. The
Parole Commission was charged with setting his release date if it con-
cluded that he [or she] was sufficiently rehabilitated. At present, the con-
cepts of indeterminate sentencing and parole release depend for their
justification exclusively upon this model of "coercive" rehabilitation -
the theory of correction that ties prison release dates to the successful
completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling programs
within the prisons.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1983) (footnote omitted), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223.
7. SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 3, at 6-9; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 2,
§ 1.3, at 9-15 (noting criticism of indeterminate sentencing and rise of determi-
nate sentencing).
8. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 ("Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory
came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable
goal for most cases."). The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 cited to the following analyses as illustrations of the ineffectiveness of correc-
tional treatment: DAVID F. GREENBURG, MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE: THE CORREC.
TIONAL EFFECTS OF CORRECTIONS (1974) (unpublished summary of effectiveness
studies prepared by Committee for Study of Incarceration); DOUGLAS LIPTON ET
AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT
EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Martinson, What Works: Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, 1947 PUB. INTEREST 22; James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effective-
ness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67 (1971). S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 & n.16 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223 n.16.
9. Alfred Blumstein, Sentencing Reforms: Impacts and Implications, 68 JUDICA-
TURE 129, 130 (1984).
10. Id.; S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3232 ("[Slentencing in the [flederal courts is characterized by
1995] 579
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1984, enacted a determinate sentencing scheme, abolishing parole
release and creating an independent commission charged with
promulgating mandatory sentencing guidelines."1
A little more than a decade after the authorization of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission, American society is revisiting the late
nineteenth century repudiation of determinate sentencing. Critics
of the Guidelines quarrel with the undue severity of sentences; the
elimination of trial judges' discretion in sentencing, including the
ability to consider such personal characteristics of the defendant as
education, vocational skills, family and community ties, mental and
emotional conditions, and drug and alcohol dependency; the com-
plexity of the Guidelines; the failure of the Guidelines to reduce
disparity; and, as in the late nineteenth century, problems of prison
overcrowding 1 2
unwarranted disparity and by uncertainty about the length of time offenders will
serve in prison .... This disparity is fair neither to the offenders nor to the pub-
lic."); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FORJuSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971); see CAMPBELL, supra note 2, § 1:3, at 9-
12 (noting discrepancy in sentences and that factors such as race and gender were
influencing sentencing decisions); SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 3, at 7-8.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994) (establishing
Sentencing Commission and defining its duties). The legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act accepted that the rehabilitation approach to sentencing
had failed. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223. The Sentencing Commission presumed the purpose of
punishment to be the control of crime. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 1, Pt. A, at 3 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The
Commission found it unnecessary to choose between two prevailing theories: a
'Just desserts" principle, under which punishment is tailored to the offender's cul-
pability and to the harm to the victims, and a "crime control" theory, where
sentences are gauged to lessen the probability of future crime either by incapaci-
tating the defendant or deterring others. Id. at 4. In the Commission's view, in
most sentencing determinations, either philosophy yields the same result. Id.
The Guidelines generally reject rehabilitation as the object of the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994) ("The Commission shall insure that the [G]uidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment."). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (D) ("The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence
imposed.., to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.").
United States DistrictJudge Marvin Frankel first proposed the concept of sen-
tencing guidelines. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT OR-
DER (1972). By 1995, 22 states had created sentencing commissions and guidelines
were in effect in 17 of those states. Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Re-
form: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 171 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDI-
CATURE 180 (1995) (noting hostile reactions to Guidelines and that criticisms and
suggestions have been offered by number of professionals that address areas of
judicial concern). Judicial criticisms of the Guidelines are collected in United
States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 968-70 (Edwards, J., concurring) (providing
580 [Vol. 40: p. 577
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In any sentencing era, the sentence imposed and actually
served in a given case is the end product of several players: the
legislature, the prosecutor, the victim, the defense counsel, the de-
fendant, the parole office, the trial judge and in some cases, the
jury. Yet, save for the handful of cases selected for review by the
United States Supreme Court, in most federal cases the final arbiter
of the sentence is the court of appeals.
This Article assesses the evolution of the sentencing philoso-
phy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It
concludes that in the wake of the historic fluctuation between reha-
bilitation and retribution as the overarching goal of sentencing,
and the alternating indeterminate and determinate sentencing
schemes used to effectuate these goals, the Third Circuit has not
veered from its philosophy of "appellate determinacy."
II. THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONS BEFORE THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
The creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in 1891 3 coincided with the ascendancy of rehabilita-
tion as the principal mission of sentencing. From its inception until
the institution of the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, the Third Cir-
cuit's review of sentencing decisions displayed unwavering loyalty to
three tenets. First, if the district court's sentence is contrary to the
punishment established by Congress, the court of appeals will re-
verse the sentence regardless of how sound the reasons lodged for
departure from the statutory penalty. Second, even if the punish-
ment is consonant with the legislative prescription, the Third Cir-
cuit will reverse if the process giving rise to the sentence is flawed.
Finally, assuming the sentence comports with the statutory scheme
and is imposed through appropriate procedures, the Third Circuit
will not reverse the district court's selection of the sentence,
notwithstanding the court of appeals' view as to the sentence's se-
verity or compatibility with the aims of sentencing. Every decision
during the first century of the Third Circuit's existence was deter-
mined under these three principles.
appendix of cases and authorities). See also SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 3, at 9-
12 (noting criticisms of determinate sentencing); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Reforming the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Appellate Review of Discretionary Sentencing Decisions, 1
HARV. LATINO L. REv. 177 (1994) (criticizing Federal Sentencing Guidelines as
incomprehensible).
13. The Court of Appeals was created by the Circuit Court of Appeals Act,
also known as the Evarts Act, ch. 517, stat. 826 (1891).
1995]
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A. Tenet #1: The Court Will Reverse Any Sentence Contrary to the
Punishment Fixed by Congress
The first aspect of appellate determinacy practiced by the
Third Circuit before the Sentencing Guidelines was its persistent
reversal of any district court sentence that was contrary to the legis-
lative prescription, regardless of how meritorious the sentencing
court's reasons for departing from the statutory scheme to accom-
plish rehabilitation of the offender. The court stated the rationale
for this tenet in Ruiz v. United States.14
Fixing the limits of the punishment to be imposed for
crime is a legislative function. It is the duty of the district
court to impose the sentence which it regards as appropri-
ate within the limits thus fixed and if it does so its action
will not be disturbed on appeal. But where the sentence
imposed is at variance with the statutory requirements, it
may be corrected to conform to the provisions of the
statute .... 15
Reversal is guaranteed if the sentence imposed is greater than
that authorized by Congress. D'Allessandro v. United States16 pro-
vided a routine illustration of this aspect of Third Circuit jurispru-
14. 365 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1966).
15. Id. at 502 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit in Ruiz reversed a sen-
tence of life imprisonment as the penalty for the commission of second degree
murder because, under the Virgin Islands Code, "the punishment of life imprison-
ment may be imposed only for first degree murder." Id. at 501-02; see also Virgin
Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 828-29, 833 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that district
court erred in imposing mandatory minimum sentence for attempted rape where
statute providing minimum sentence for rape makes no reference to punishment
for attempted rape); United States v. Gomberg, 715 F.2d 843, 851 (3d Cir. 1983)
(stating that Congress did not intend that defendant, sentenced under Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971, for engag-
ing in continuing criminal enterprise, receive separate sentences for conspiracy
and underlying predicate offenses), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984); United
States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (holding that Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971, does not au-
thorize separate sentences for convictions for possession of controlled substance
with intent to distribute and actual distribution of controlled substance when con-
victions relate to same single drug transaction), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979);
Virgin Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that district
court erred by imposing separate sentence under Virgin Islands Habitual Criminal
Statute rather than imposing increased sentence for underlying felony giving rise
to prosecution), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315,
318 (3d Cir. 1946) (holding that imposition of consecutive sentences on each of
four counts of violation of Second War Powers Act was not authorized by statute
where counts charge single offense).
16. 90 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1937).
[Vol. 40: p. 577
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dence. In that case, the court overturned the trial court's
imposition of a five-year sentence for conspiracy to transport a wo-
man with the intent that she be induced to engage in prostitution,
because the maximum sentence assigned by Congress for the of-
fense was two years. 17
More interesting was the court's disposition in United States v.
Mazzei.18 Mazzei, a Pennsylvania state senator, was convicted of ex-
tortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.19 In addition to sentencing
Mazzei to incarceration and imposing a fine, the district court or-
dered Mazzei removed from office as a Pennsylvania state senator. 20
The Third Circuit reversed the portion of the sentence removing
Mazzei from office, finding that Congress had not authorized such
punishment under the Hobbs Act.2 1 The district court had relied
upon a Pennsylvania statute requiring public officials to forfeit of-
fice upon conviction of extortion.22 The Pennsylvania statute ex-
pressly provided that " 'the sentence imposed by the court shall
include the direction for the removal from office of such per-
son.' 123 The court of appeals rejected the government's conten-
tion that even where Congress did not authorize removal, the
sentencing court had inherent authority to enforce the policy of
the Pennsylvania statute.24 To the contrary, the court reasoned that
the district court's sentencing power is limited to the punishment
prescribed by Congress.25
The Third Circuit's fidelity to the iegislative will has extended
not only to sentences exceeding congressional limits; it also has
caused the court unfailingly to reverse sentences that fall beneath
the statutory minimum, no matter how compelling the justification.
17. Id. at 640-41.
18. 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
19. Id. at 640 (citing Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)). The Hobbs Act
proscribed "[the obtaining of property from another, without his [or her] con-
sent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2). The Hobbs Act prohibits
affecting commerce by extortion. Id. § 1951(a). Senator Mazzei had required a
lessor of office space for the Bureau of State Lotteries and the Department of
Labor and Industry to pay 10% of the gross rents to a senate finance re-election
committee. Maz*ei, 521 F.2d at 640-41.
20. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 645-46 (noting sentence of district court).
21. Id.
22. Id. (noting reliance of district court on statute and citing 65 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 121 (Supp. 1974)).
23. Id. at 646 (quoting 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 121).
24. Id. The Third Circuit also repudiated the argument that removal could
be imposed as a condition of release pending appeal or be enforced as a collateral




Gildin: Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United St
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In Virgin Islands v. David,26 the trial judge refused to impose the
mandatory minimum prison sentence required by the Virgin Is-
lands Habitual Criminal Information Act (Act).27 The Act specified
that any person found guilty of a felony in the Virgin Islands who
had a previous felony conviction must be incarcerated for not less
than ten years.28 It was undisputed that the defendant was a "habit-
ual criminal" within the meaning of the statute.2 9 The trial judge
refused, however, to sentence the defendant to the minimum pen-
alty because the prosecutors had not been uniformly seeking to ap-
ply the Act to repeat offenders. 30 In the trial judge's opinion, the
government appeared to be using the prospect of the mandatory
minimum to extract favorable plea bargains.31
The Third Circuit did not betray its view as to the propriety of
utilizing the specter of a mandatory sentence as a plea bargaining
tool. Instead, the court of appeals' reversal rested entirely on its
interpretation of the legislative will.3 2 The Third Circuit first noted
that the statute did not demand that the government invoke the Act
in every case to which it could apply.33 Rather, the prosecutor had
discretion to seek the mandatory minimum, discretion which was
limited only by the constitutional proscription of selective enforce-
ment based upon " 'race, religion, or other arbitrary classifica-
tion.' "34 Because neither the defendant nor the trial judge raised
26. 741 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 653-55 (noting district court's refusal to comply with statute and
citing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 61(a) (Supp. 1982)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 654.
30. Id. at 654-55.
31. Id. at 655 (noting claim by district judge that Act was used as "tool" in
arranging plea bargains). The Act required the government to file a habitual
criminal information in order to trigger the mandatory sentencing provisions. See
id. at 654 (citing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 62 (Supp. 1982); see also id. (noting filing
of habitual criminal information pursuant to V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 61-62
(Supp. 1982) and noting no deficiency in filing or service of habitual criminal
information). The trial judge's critique is one that has been similarly lodged by
opponents of current Sentencing Guidelines. For a further discussion of the views
of Sentencing Guidelines opponents, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. See id. at 656 (finding "no reason for a district court judge to refuse to
apply this statute, which was properly enacted by the Virgin Islands legislature").
33. Id. at 655 (noting prosecutor is not "bound to invoke the statute in every
case").
34. Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1961)); see also Virgin Is-
lands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding absent racial discrimina-
tion, no equal protection violation from prosecutor's decision to file habitual
criminal information against defendant accused of grand larceny despite past in-
ternal policy of not filing information in cases involving grand larceny); Virgin
Islands v. Ramos, 730 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that sentencing pursuant
to Habitual Criminal Act does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where
[Vol. 40: p. 577584
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an allegation of unconstitutional selective enforcement, the court
of appeals held that the trial judge erred by failing to impose the
ten-year minimum term mandated by the Act.35
Perhaps the most striking instance of the Third Circuit's adher-
ence to the sanctity of legislatively-prescribed punishment was
United States v. Martinez-Zayas.3 6 Martinez-Zayas was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (a).37 In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress provided
that anyone convicted of violating § 841(a) who possessed more
than five kilograms of cocaine must be sentenced to a minimum of
ten years imprisonment without parole. 38 Despite the fact that Mar-
tinez-Zayas was convicted of possession with intent to distribute
twelve kilograms of cocaine, the trial judge sentenced her to only
five years imprisonment.39 The court elected not to impose the
mandatory minimum because Martinez-Zayas did not fall within the
realm of drug kingpins Congress attempted to reach in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act.40 Instead, the court noted that the defendant sub-
sisted on welfare and was a mid-level drug dealer in an operation
spearheaded by her boyfriend. 41
sentence was neither disproportionate to crime nor inconsistent with sentence that
defendant could have received absent habitual criminal charge); cf United States
v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 215-17 (3d Cir.) (holding that sentencing under Armed
Career Criminal amendment to 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (repealed 1986), which
imposed minimum sentence for possession of gun by person who has three previ-
ous convictions for robbery or burglary, does not violate. equal protection; it
neither creates suspect classification nor impinges upon fundamental interest, and
it has rational relationship to legitimate government purpose of reduction of rob-
beries and burglaries committed by career criminals), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833
(1987).
35. David, 741 F.2d at 656. The Third Circuit instructed the trial judge to be
guided in resentencing by the court's directions in Virgin Islands v. George, de-
cided the same day. Id. (citing Virgin Islands v. George, 741 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1984)). In George, the court of appeals upheld the defendant's contention that his
privilege against self-incrimination had been violated. George, 741 F.2d at 645.
During the sentencing proceeding, the trial judge, without advising George of his
right to remain silent, asked whether he had been previously convicted of a felony
and used George's admission to enhance the sentence. Id. at 648. The Third Cir-
cuit prescribed the colloquy required in a habitual offender proceeding before a
trial judge could accept the defendant's admission that he had been previously
convicted of a felony for purposes of the habitual offender statute. Id. at 650 &
n.4. George exemplifies the second tenet of the Third Circuit's sentencing philoso-
phy. For a further discussion of the second tenet of the Third Circuit's sentencing
philosophy, see infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
36. 857 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1988).
37. Id. at 124 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Supp. 1986)).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A).
39. Martinz-Zayas, 857 F.2d at 124.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 126.
1995]
9
Gildin: Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United St
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
586 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: p. 577
Granting the government's petition for a writ of mandamus,
the Third Circuit reversed the trial judge's refusal to apply the ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence. 42 The Third Circuit reasoned
that both the language and the legislative history of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 manifested Congress' intent to make drug quan-
tity the lone trigger for imposition of the ten-year mandatory mini-
mum. 43 The court of appeals acknowledged that the district court's
finding that Martinez-Zayas was not a major drug trafficker is cus-
tomarily a proper factor to consider in sentencing.44 It further ac-
cepted that employing drug quantity as the dispositive criterion
unfairly subjects lower-level dealers to the mandatory minimum
sentence. 45 Indeed, the court observed, application of the
mandatory sentencing scheme in the instant case relegated Marti-
nez-Zayas to the same penalty as the nation's major drug distribu-
tors.4 6 While questioning the fairness of this result, the court of
appeals nonetheless directed the district court to vacate the
sentence and resentence defendant to the mandatory ten-year
minimum. 47
The reasoning in Martinez-Zayas exemplifies the Third Circuit's
unwillingness to supplant the legislative judgment with the court's
own sentencing philosophy. The opinion professes the court of ap-
peals' view that "[a]lthough Congress should provide guides and
establish limits to a court's exercise of sentencing discretion, statu-
tory withdrawal of all judicial discretion may lead to unfair re-
suits." 48 The court further critiqued the resultant "transfer[ring of]
the sentencing function from the court to the prosecutor."49 Yet,
despite the fact that the trial court's refusal to sentence defendant
to a ten-year minimum squared with the Third Circuit's sentencing
philosophy, the court of appeals subordinated its views to the judg-
ment of the legislature, concluding that "[a]lthough we question
the soundness of this approach in cases like this one, we are not
'licensed to attempt to soften the clear import of Congress' chosen
42. Id. at 124, 132.
43. Id. at 130-32.
44. Id. at 132 (noting that consideration of such factors as role in drug opera-
tion in sentencing is generally within discretion of trial judge). The court ob-
served, however, that in this case, district judges were "expressly barred" from the
exercise of such discretion by Congress. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id. at 132-33, 137 (recognizing presentencing court's decision and ac-
knowledging court's questioning of sentencing approach in such cases).
48. Id. at 132 n.5.
49. Id. at 133.
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words whenever [we believe] those words lead to a harsh result.' "50
At no time prior to the institution of the Sentencing Guidelines has
the Third Circuit attempted to appropriate such license.
B. Tenet #2: The Court Will Reverse If Procedural Errors Infect the
Sentence
Even if the punishment comports with the will of Congress, the
Third Circuit will vacate the sentence if it is the product of proce-
dural error. The domain of potential procedural problems was sig-
nificantly narrowed in Williams v. New York, 51 where the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Constitution does not limit the sentenc-
ing judge to consideration of evidence that is presented in open
court.52 Nonetheless, in Moore v. United States,53 the court of ap-
peals ruled that due process requires that a sentence must be va-
cated where the trial judge relies upon erroneous information
contained in a presentence investigation report.54
The Moore court observed that in order to preserve fairness in
the criminal system, it is essential that the background data upon
which the sentence is based be reliable, for "[u]nderlying the gath-
ering of such information about an accused is the philosophy of
individualized punishment, which is based on the thought that it is
appropriate to tailor a sentence as closely as possible to the circum-
stances of a particular defendant."55 The court of appeals' willing-
ness to intrude on the discretion of the trial judge was not premised
upon second-guessing the sentence necessary to rehabilitate the de-
fendant. Rather, the Moore reasoning rested upon constitutional
considerations. In Townsend v. Burke,56 the Supreme Court held
that sentences based upon untrue assumptions concerning the de-
fendant's criminal record violate the Due Process Clause of the
50. Id.; see also United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1959)
(finding that sentencing of defendant under Youth Corrections Act "calls attention
to appellant's need for rehabilitation," but legislation exempting from Act offenses
for which there is mandatory penalty is "within the power of Congress to establish"
and "not for the courts to disturb").
51. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
52. Id. at 250-51. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides that "[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of
a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive
and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661 (1994).
53. 571 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1978).
54. Id. at 183-84 & n.7.
55. Id. at 182 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
56. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
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Constitution. 57 Accordingly, the Third Circuit ruled that the lower
court was required to hold a hearing on Moore's contention that
his presentence report contained false information; if the hearing
confirmed Moore's allegation, due process required that Moore be
resentenced. 58
The court of appeals also has overturned sentences where a
defendant is improperly resentenced to a longer term after success-
fully overturning the original conviction upon appeal. In United
57. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
444-45, 449 (1972) (remanding for reconsideration of sentence where trial judge,
in determining sentence, considered two convictions obtained when defendant
was unrepresented by counsel in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963)).
58. Moore, 571 F.2d at 184-85. Two issues arise with respect to challenges to
information utilized in sentencing. The first issue is the reliability of the informa-
tion. Compare United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that pending indictments are sufficiently reliable to warrant consideration by
sentencingjudge), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973) with United States v. Baylin, 696
F.2d 1030, 1032 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that trial judge erred in enhancing sen-
tence based upon governmental agreement not to prosecute defendant on related
charges) and United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1971) (vacat-
ing sentence based upon unsworn statements by informant), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1061 (1972). The second issue is whether the sentencing judge relied upon the
challenged information. United States v. Allen, 494 F.2d 1216, 1218 (3d Cir.) (re-
fusing to vacate sentence based upon statements in letter where trial judge ex-
pressly stated that he was not relying on letter in imposing sentence), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 852 (1974).
The Third Circuit also has been insistent upon the need to afford defendants
the opportunity for a hearing concerning facts relied upon in sentencing. See Vir-
gin Islands v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 892, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1974) (remanding for
resentencing where defendant's counsel was not given opportunity to explain
hearsay allegations that while awaiting trial, defendant tried to light prison guard
on fire); cf Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d 1066, 1066-70 (3d Cir. 1978) (enti-
tling prisoner to de novo sentencing proceeding where he establishes that initial
sentence was based upon improper information and original sentencing judge has
died; to resentence based upon initial record would deprive defendant of com-
mon-law right of allocution as well as "deprive the judge of the opportunity to
evaluate the total person who stands at the bar ofjustice"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944
(1979).
Indeed, the Third Circuit was one of only two federal courts of appeals that
ruled that a trial judge may not impose a more severe sentence because of the
court's belief that defendant had lied at trial; to do so, the court felt, would punish
the defendant without an opportunity to be heard. United States v. Grayson, 550
F.2d 103, 105-08 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). The United States
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the defendant's willingness to commit
perjury is a proper factor to consider in individualizing the sentence to defend-
ant's potential rehabilitation. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1978)
(noting agreement among most circuits that defendant's truthfulness is probative
of rehabilitation prospects). The Court rejected defendant's claim that enhancing
the sentence for supposed perjury offended due process by punishing him for a
crime for which he was not indicted, tried or convicted. Id. at 52-54. It further
dismissed the argument that consideration of conduct at trial unconstitutionally
chilled defendant's right to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 54-55.
[Vol. 40: p. 577588
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States v. Carrasquillo,59 defendant was sentenced to concurrent three
year prison terms after she entered a conditional guilty plea to two
counts of an indictment charging her with distribution of heroin in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and aiding and abetting such dis-
tribution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.60 After the judgment was
reversed on appeal, the defendant pled guilty to a second informa-
tion arising out of the same incident and was sentenced to twelve
years imprisonment.61 The trial court increased the second sen-
tence as a result of Carrasquillo's continued involvement in drug-
related activities and her continued abuse of narcotics in the period
following her initial conviction.62
The court of appeals vacated the sentence, finding it violated
the constitutional limits on resentencing following successful
appeals established by North Carolina v. Pearce.63 In Pearce, the
Supreme Court determined that neither the Double Jeopardy nor
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution is contravened if
there are "events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown
new light upon the defendant's life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities'" that merited a more severe sen-
tence following the conviction. 64 However, the defendant's right to
be free from deprivations of liberty without due process of law is
invaded where an enhanced sentence is imposed in retaliation for
the challenge to the initial conviction.65 To ensure that the in-
creased sentence is not a product of vengeance, the Supreme Court
established a prophylactic rule requiring the trial judge to set forth
affirmatively the reasons for imposing a more extreme sentence,
reasons which "must be based upon objective information concern-
ing identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring af-
ter the time of the original sentencing proceeding." 66
While careful not to accuse the trial judge of retaliating against
Carrasquillo for successfully contesting her first conviction, the
court of appeals found that the reasons articulated for extending
Carrasquillo's sentence were not based upon discrete conduct oc-
59. 732 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 1161.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1161-62. The trial judge averred that the second sentence was not
longer than the initial sentence but was a "restructuring" of that sentence. Id. at
1161. On appeal, the government conceded that the second sentence was
lengthier. Id. at 1162.
63. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
64. Id. at 723 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949)).
65. Id. at 723-24.
66. Id. at 726.
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curring after her initial conviction. 67 To the contrary, Carras-
quillo's drug abuse was a continuation of the addictive condition
that had existed at the time she was first sentenced and hence could
not support a more prolonged sentence under the constitutional
standards set forth in Pearce.6
In both Moore and Carrasquillo, the court took pains to articu-
late that it was not attempting to trammel upon the trial court's
discretionary sentencing power. In Moore, the court endorsed the
"traditional view.., that a district court possesses wide-ranging dis-
cretion,"69 but reasoned that the courts of appeal do not inappro-
priately invade that discretion by scrutinizing the judicial process by
which the punishment is fixed.70 Likewise, in - Carrasquillo, the
Third Circuit empathized with the "uncharted seas" voyaged by a
sentencing judge confronted with a drug-addicted defendant and
acknowledged the "severe limitations" on appellate review of origi-
nal sentences that fall within statutory maximums. 71 Just as Moore
dealt with the process rather than the product of the punishment,
Carrasquillo raised an issue distinct from the appropriateness of the
penalty levied. The Carrasquillo court was enforcing the constitu-
tional limits on punishments following a successful appeal. The
avowedly limited nature of the incursion on the trial court's judg-
ment, which the Third Circuit's procedural review represents, is
confirmed by examination of those cases in which the court is
squarely asked to review the discretionary punishment selected by
the sentencing judge where the sentence is consistent with the legis-
lative will and procedural regularity.
C. Tenet #3: The Court of Appeals Will Not Reverse a Sentence That
Comports with the Legislative Scheme and Is Imposed Through
Proper Procedures
The Third Circuit has had the greatest theoretical opportunity
67. United States v. Carrasquillo, 732 F.2d 1160, 1162 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (not-
ing that court does not suggest that increased sentence was motivated by vindictive-
ness but also noting that defendant's drug addiction was continuation of her old
behavior).
68. Id. at 1166. The court of appeals observed that had the trial court rested
its decision on the fact that Carrasquillo had been arrested three times since the
original conviction, the subsequent criminal activity would have supported a
lengthier sentence. Id. at 1163. The sentencing judge, however, had expressly
stated that he was not considering those three arrests as evidence of defendant's
guilt on those charges, all of which were terminated by nolle prosequi. Id. at 1163.
69. Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 181-82.
71. Carrasquillo, 732 F.2d at 1166.
[Vol. 40: p. 577
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to express its philosophy in reviewing punishments, within statutory
bounds and imposed through proper procedures, which the court
considers at variance with the rehabilitative goal of sentencing. Yet
without exception, the court of appeals has refused to second guess
a sentence that comports with required procedures and the statu-
tory scheme, regardless of the court's view as to the severity of the
sentence or its consistency with the aims of sentencing. The earliest
and most prescient articulation of this aspect of the Third Circuit's
philosophy of appellate determinacy is set forth in Camorata v.
United States. 72 "In imposing sentences much latitude is accorded
trial courts, and with sentences imposed within the terms of the
statutes, appellate courts have little or nothing to do."73
The Third Circuit has steadfastly refused to quarrel with the
district courts' rejection of claims that a sentence will impose un-
due hardship upon the defendant or his family. In United States v.
Swartz,7 4 a physician was hospitalized for heart irregularity before
beginning to serve his one-year prison term for tax evasion. The
district court denied defendant's motion to suspend the sentence
or to order immediate parole despite evidence from medical wit-
nesses that if incarcerated, defendant would probably die within the
year because of his heart condition as well as past medical history of
diabetes, angina, uremia and hypertension. 75 The Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's refusal to suspend the sentence, reason-
ing that because the sentence was within the five-year statutory
maximum for tax evasion, "this Court is powerless to modify or re-
duce it."7 6
In United States v. Fessler,77 the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's unwillingness to reduce a five-year prison term im-
72. 2 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1924).
73. Id. at 651; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("[A]
sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally
not subject to review."); United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1173 (3d Cir.
1986) (same), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d
765, 782 n.26 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983).
While the Camorata court refused to question the district court's sentence, it
did hold that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea when he learned that the court intended to impose a sen-
tence based upon information concerning defendant's complicity in a crime
charged in a count to which he had not pleaded guilty. Id. Hence, Camorata is
consistent with Tenet #2 as well as Tenet #3 of appellate determinacy.
74. 464 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1972).
75. Id. at 1299.
76. Id. The court further noted that defendant failed to prove that existing
government medical facilities could not provide him with treatment comparable to
private institutions. Id.
77. 453 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1972).
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posed as a result of defendant's conviction for assaulting a postal
employee with intent to rob. Defendant argued that the sentence
was excessive in light of the fact ihat incarceration would relegate
his epileptic wife and stepchild to the public welfare rolls.78 Be-
cause the sentence was within the statutory limits, the court again
declined to scrutinize the determination of the sentencing judge.79
The Third Circuit also has refused to reverse the trial court's
disregard of the jury's plea for leniency. In United States v. Lee,80
following twelve hours of deliberation, the jury found defendant
guilty of embezzling and unlawfully opening first class mail in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1709 and 1703(a). With its verdict slip, the
jurors submitted a separate note signed by each of the jurors urging
the court "to exercise extreme leniency."81 Rejecting the defend-
ant's contention that the trial judge abused his discretion by ignor-
ing the jurors' plea and imposing a one-year prison sentence, the
court of appeals reasoned simply that "[t]he sentence was within
the statutory limitation, and we may not review it."82
While the just-discussed opinions did not reveal the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion as to the sentences under review, the court of appeals
has refused to reverse sentences even in cases where it overtly dis-
agrees with the sentence handed down by the trialjudge. In Virgin
Islands v. Venzen, a3 defendant was convicted of three counts of pass-
ing forged checks in the amounts of $42, $68 and $68. The trial
court imposed consecutive sentences of seven years imprisonment on
each count. Although noting that the sentences constituted a
"harsh aggregation," the court ruled that defendant was not sub-
78. Id. at 954 n.5.
79. Id. at 954-55; see also United States v. Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 129 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion to deny defendant's re-
quest for one year to pay assessment upon conviction for forging endorsement on
check in light of defendant's unemployment and indigency).
The Fessler court distinguished its opinion in United States v. Ginzburg, 398
F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971). In that case, the court had
reversed the trial court's refusal to afford defendant a hearing on his motion for
reconsideration of a sentence. The Fessler court pointed out that the reversal in
Ginzburgwas based upon the trial court's abuse of discretion in refusing to hold a
hearing and did not entail review of the district court's sentence. Fessler, 453 F.2d
at 954. The Third Circuit's distinction of Ginzburg exemplifies the difference be-
tween cases falling within Tenet #2 and Tenet #3.
80. 532 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.), cert. -denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976).
81. Id. at 913.
82. Id. at 916. The court of appeals also held that the trial court had not
erred by refusing to question the jurors to determine whether the plea for leniency
was a condition of the verdict of guilt, relying upon the general rule that a jury's
sentencing recommendation "does not affect the validity of the verdict and may be
disregarded as surplusage." Id. at 914.
83. 424 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 40: p. 577
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/6
APPELLATE DETERMINACY
jected to cruel and unusual punishment under either the United
States Constitution or the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands.84 Be-
cause each of the sentences was within the maximum of thirty years
imprisonment that could have been ordered, the court believed it-
self powerless to review the prison term imposed. 5 The court even
rejected the invitation of the Supreme Court to make "gentle inti-
mations of the necessity for [possible reduction of a sentence] to
the District Court,"8 6 electing instead to point out that its disposi-
tion of the appeal did not preclude the sentencing court from us-
ing its discretion to reduce the sentence upon proper motion by
the defendant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.87
Perhaps the most dramatic instance of the court subordinating
its views to the discretion of the trial judge is United States v. Smith.38
Defendant appealed from the district court's refusal to reduce his
twelve-year prison sentence despite the fact that following convic-
tion, defendant cooperated with the government in prosecuting a
bribery conspiracy.8 9 The Third Circuit squarely admitted that it
"probably would have come to a different conclusion" than the trial
judge;90 nonetheless, it affirmed the denial of the motion to reduce
the sentence, finding that whether or not to reduce the sentence in
light of defendant's cooperation was within the court's discretion. 91
It observed that while a trial judge certainly may reduce a sentence
for post-conviction cooperation, no authority mandates that the
court do so. 92
84. Id. at 523; see also Virgin Islands v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 712, 719 (3d Cir. 1973)
("While this sentence is a long one, it is within the limits determined by the legisla-
ture and, therefore, not subject to review here.").
85. Venzen, 424 F.2d at 523. The court of appeals did reverse the portion of
the district court's sentence directing the parole board not to consider releasing
defendant on parole until he had served 10 years of the 21-year prison term. The
court held that this aspect of the sentence invaded the discretion that the legisla-
ture had vested in the parole board and hence exceeded the power of the trial
judge. Id.
86. Id. (citing Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366 (1958)).
87. Id.
88. 839 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1988).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 180.
91. Id. at 181. The Court also rejected defendant's submission that the trial
court erred by: a) using immunized testimony against defendant; b) giving de-
fendant a sentence disproportionate to his co-defendants; and c) failing to reduce
the sentence due to defendant's poor health and professional and financial hard-
ship. Id. at 178-79.
92. Id. at 180. While the majority construed the trial judge's opinion as bal-
ancing defendant's cooperation against the severity of the crime, Judge Becker,
dissenting, believed that the district court had refused to entertain evidence of
substantial post-conviction cooperation as a factor in reducing sentences. Id. at
1995]
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D. Summary
In the almost 100 years prior to the institution of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, the Third Circuit hewed to its proclamation in
Camorata that, "with sentences imposed within the term of the stat-
utes," and through regular procedures, the court of appeals has "lit-
tie or nothing to do."93 In no instance did it vacate or modify a
sentence merely because it offended the court of appeals' sentenc-
ing philosophy. While the first century of the Third Circuit's sen-
tencing decisions was marked by its fidelity to appellate
determinacy, the occasion to recast its historic role was thrust upon
the court by Congress' passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.9
4
183 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker considered this blanket refusal a viola-
tion of statutory law as well as contrary to policies designed to secure cooperation.
HoweverJudge Becker subscribed to the majority's view that the trial judge retains
discretion whether to reduce a sentence after considering defendant's coopera-
tion, and indicated that he would have joined the majority's opinion declining to
reverse if he were persuaded that the trial judge had at least considered the de-
fendant's cooperation. Id. at 185 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The Third Circuit has not adopted a general procedural requirement that the
district court set forth the reasons for each sentence imposed. United States v.
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1193 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1029 (1985); United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d 539, 540 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979). Judge Adams unsuccessfully urged the court to
exercise its supervisory power to require trial judges to explain the reasons for the
sentence imposed. Del Piano, 593 F.2d at 540-53 (Adams, J., concurring); United
States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130-38 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). The court did exert its supervisory power to re-
quire district courts to make specific findings as to fact issues relevant to the resti-
tution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3579, 3580 (1982). United States v. Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 494 (3d Cir. 1995);
United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985). The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 requires the court to "state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence" after the effective date of the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)
(1994). See United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
downward departure under sentencing "practice" does not state sufficient reasons
for departure); United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1212 (3d Cir.) (holding that
where sentencing court orders upward departure because criminal history cate-
gory underrepresents seriousness of defendant's past criminal conduct or likeli-
hood of committing future crimes, sentencing court is not required "to go through
a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically discusses each criminal history cate-
gory it rejects en route to the category that it selects" but "the sentencing court's
reasons for rejecting each lesser category [must] be clear from the record as a
whole"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1806 (1995); United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d
1110 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that sentencing court is obligated to proceed
through categories sequentially when departing from Guidelines).
93. 2 F.2d 650, 651 (3d Cir. 1924).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).
594 [Vol. 40: p. 577
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/6
APPELLATE DETERMINACY
III. THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONS UNDER THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act established the United States Sen-
tencing Commission, an independent commission in the judicial
branch of the government,95 to promulgate determinate sentenc-
ing guideline ranges for persons convicted of federal crimes.9 6 The
trial judge is bound by these Guidelines in sentencing,97 although
the court may deviate from the Guideline sentence if aggravating or
mitigating factors exist that the Sentencing Commission did not ad-
equately consider in promulgating the Guidelines. 98 The defend-
ant serves the entire sentence, subject only to credit earned by good
behavior while incarcerated.99
In addition to repudiating the preexisting indeterminate sen-
tencing scheme, Congress chartered the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts over sentencing appeals.' 00 The defendant or the Govern-
ment may appeal a sentence imposed "in violation of law" 10 or "as
a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." 10 2
Either party is permitted to appeal from the trial court's departure
from the guideline range; 03 the reviewing court is to determine
whether the sentence was "unreasonable."'0 4 Finally, the court of
appeals is empowered to review sentences in offenses for which
there is no sentencing guideline if the sentence imposed was
95. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1).
97. United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that it was
error to utilize sentencing "practice" rather than individualized, case-by-case appli-
cation of Guidelines governing downward departure for defendant's cooperation);
United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713, 716-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that trial
court may not disregard Guidelines to impose lesser punishment under general
purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994)); United States v.
Chiarelli, 898 F.2d 373, 385 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that district court must follow
Guidelines regardless of philosophical disagreement).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), (b) (1994).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). This was not the first instance in which the
court's role was mandated by statute. The Dangerous Special Offender Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3575 (1970), repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act, provided for en-
hancement of sentences for recidivists and professional criminals. The statute de-
fined the scope of appellate review of enhanced sentences: "Review of the
sentence shall include review whether the procedure employed was lawful, the
findings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was
abused." 18 U.S.C. § 3576.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a)(1), (b)(1).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2), (b)(2).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (3), (b)(3).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3).
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"plainly unreasonable."10 5
The legislative history makes clear that in authorizing appellate
courts to scrutinize the reasonableness of departures from the
Guidelines, Congress tempered the traditional obeisance to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge:
The sentencing provisions of the reported bill are
designed to preserve the concept that the discretion of a
sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing and
should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate
court. At the same time, they are intended to afford
enough guidance and control of the exercise of that dis-
cretion to promote fairness and rationality, and to reduce
unwarranted disparity, in sentencing.
It is an anomaly to provide for appellate correction of
prejudicial trial errors and not to provide for appellate
correction of incorrect or unreasonable sentences. 10 6
[I] t is inevitable that some of the sentences outside
the guidelines will appear to be too severe or too lenient.
Appellate review of sentences is essential to assure that the
guidelines are applied properly and to provide case law
development of the appropriate reasons for sentencing
outside the guidelines. 1°7
Thus, the Sentencing Reform Act invited courts of appeals to exert
a more expansive role in assessing whether a departure from the
Sentencing Guidelines is "unreasonable."
The one unmistakable consequence of the Sentencing Reform
Act has been an explosion of appeals. Between December of 1989
and August of 1994, 1230 of the 2044 appeals in criminal cases
docketed in the Third Circuit raised sentencing issues.' 08 The dra-
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (4).
106. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333-34. One impediment to appellate review in the pre-
Guidelines era was the fact that the trial judge generally was not required to state
the reasons for choosing the sentence. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, how-
ever, the trial judge is required to specify the reasons for the departure from the
Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994). For a further discussion of
pre-Guidelines sentencing, see supra note 92.
107. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333-34.
108. These statistics are based upon information provided by P. Douglas Sisk,
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, through the
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matic quantitative increase in appeals under the Sentencing Re-
form Act, however, was not accompanied by a correspondent
qualitative revolution or evolution in the role of the Third Circuit.
Instead, the court has remained faithful to the three tenets of ap-
pellate determinacy marking the first century of its existence.
A. Third Circuit Review of Refusals to Depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are designed to present a
structured range that the district courts must apply to the typical or
"heartland" cases. 109 At the same time, the legislature recognized
the Sentencing Commission's inability to foresee every circum-
stance which might confront the courts. Accordingly, Congress
conferred discretion upon the district courts to depart upward or
downward from the Guidelines where "there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 10 How-
ever, departures from the Guideline range are to be the exception,
court's automated docketing system. See Appendix A. Because the automated sys-
tem was activated in 1990, statistics are not available for the period between No-
vember 1, 1987, when the Guidelines became effective, and November of 1989.
The number of appeals raising sentencing issues is derived from the litigant's at-
torney, upon filing the notice of appeal, designating the case as a purely Guide-
lines case or a hybrid case raising both sentencing issues and issues pertaining to
the underlying conviction. Of the 1230 sentencing appeals, 490 were docketed as
raising purely sentencing issues and 740 as hybrid appeals.
No statistics on the number of sentencing appeals exist for the pre-Guidelines
era. Based upon research conducted in preparation for this article, it is conserva-
tively estimated that the Third Circuit issued fewer than 300 reported opinions on
sentencing in the 96 years preceding creation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The rise in sentencing appeals no doubt explains much of the overall increase
in criminal appeals in the Third Circuit. Data compiled by Ellen Hannum, re-
search librarian for The William Hastie Library of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit demonstrates a rise in the number of criminal appeals
from 32 in 1940 to 582 in 1993. See Appendix B. This represents an increase in
the percentage of criminal appeals on the docket from 9% in 1940 to 20% in 1993.
Other reported statistics mirror a marked increase in sentencing appeals fol-
lowing institution of the Guidelines. Third Circuit One of Fastest Courts to Dispose of
Cases, N.J. LAW., Sept. 5, 1994, at 5 (noting 84% increase over six years in criminal
appeals per federal panel); Sentencing Overload Hits the Circuits: AppellateJudges Stag-
ger Under Guidelines-Generated Appeals, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1 (finding that
between 1988 and 1992, 23,000 Guidelines' appeals representing almost half of all
federal appellate cases); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 901, 906 n.17 (1991) (noting that fed-
eral appellate courts probably decide about 1000 cases each year concerning appli-
cation of Guidelines).
109. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. cmt. 4; id. § 5K2,0.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.SS.G., supra note 11, § 5K2.0.
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not the rule.1 1'
The Third Circuit has remained steadfast in its deference to
the judgment of Congress and to the sentencing discretion of the
district court by holding that a refusal to depart from the Guide-
lines is not reviewable on appeal unless the trial judge erred in as-
sessing the power to depart. 112 The seminal case on refusals to
depart is United States v. Denardi."5 In Denardi, the district court
identified as mitigating factors the defendant's cooperation with
the government, the absence of a prior criminal record, exemplary
work history, and devotion to friends and family. In addition, the
defendant argued that a sentence within the Guideline range would
work a severe hardship on his family. 114 Yet, the court refused to
exercise its acknowledged power to deviate from the Guideline
range. 115
The court of appeals refused to second guess the district
court's rebuff of the request to depart. To the contrary, in keeping
with its pre-Guidelines fidelity to the intent of Congress, the court
of appeals held that it entirely lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
The court found no basis for appellate jurisdiction in any of the
four subsections of the Sentencing Reform Act authorizing appeals
by defendant 1 6  and dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction.' 17
. Similarly, the Third Circuit has found that it lacks jurisdiction
where the trial judge has departed from the Guidelines, but a party
is dissatisfied with the modest extent of the departure. In United
111. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
112. United States v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 1995).
113. 892 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1989).
114. Id. at 271.
115. Id.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1994).
117. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 272. Judge Becker, dissenting, argued that the court
had jurisdiction under its statutory power to accept defense appeals from
sentences imposed in violation of law. Id. at 274 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)). In Judge Becker's view, a refusal to depart may violate 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which requires that a sentence imposed by a district court "be
sufficient, but not greater than necessary to meet the four purposes of sentencing"
set forth in § 3553 (a) (2) - punishment, deterrence, protection of the public,
and providing defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment. Id. at 277 (Becker, J., dissenting). Reversal
of a refusal to depart would be warranted only where application of the Guidelines
in the particular case results in a sentence "plainly unreasonable" in light of the
various statutory considerations listed in § 3553(a). Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
598 [Vol. 40: p. 577
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States v. Parker,118 the Guidelines range applicable to defendant's
conviction for knowingly and intentionally distributing a controlled
substance was six to twelve months imprisonment.' 19 The Govern-
ment filed a motion under Guidelines section 5KI.1 requesting a
downward departure because defendant had provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person.
The trial court then sentenced defendant to probation, but as a
condition of probation ordered that defendant reside for six
months in the Greater Philadelphia Center for Community Correc-
tions. Although permitted to work, defendant was required to re-
turn to the Center each evening. On appeal, defendant argued
that confinement in the Center was equivalent to the minimum in-
carceration under the Guidelines and thus the court erred by fail-
ing to grant a downward departure. 120
The court of appeals rejected defendant's contention that resi-
dence in the community corrections facility with work release privi-
leges was equivalent to imprisonment, finding instead that the
district court had departed from the Guidelines. Hence, defend-
ant's appeal amounted to a complaint about the inadequacy of the
downward departure. As the court lacked jurisdiction to hear ap-
peals from refusals to depart, the Third Circuit reasoned, "[i]t
surely follows from [Denardi] that we could not possibly have juris-
diction to hear an appeal by the defendant where there has been
some downward departure."121
While it lacks jurisdiction to review a district court's refusal to
depart, the court of appeals will exercise jurisdiction where the trial
judge erroneously believed that the Guidelines precluded depar-
ture. Jurisdiction exists to review claims that the sentence was im-
posed in violation of law or as a result of incorrect application of
the Guidelines. 122 In such cases, the court is not purporting to criti-
118. 902 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 222.
121. Id.; United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 668 n.11 (3d Cir. 1993); cf.
United States v. Pekakis, 937 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that under
Denardi, court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over appeal from refusal to sentence
defendant to home, community or halfway house detention rather than imprison-
ment where Guidelines § 5C1.1(c) (2) affords trial court discretion to impose sub-
stitute confinement).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1), (a)(2) (1994); United States v. Spiropoulos, 976
F.2d 155, 160 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that appellate review of sentences im-
posed because of mistake of law or incorrect application of Guidelines is permitted
and distinguishable from situations where appellate court is asked to review discre-
tionary refusal to depart). In United States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219 (3d Cir.
1991), the court rejected the argument that in order to permit the court of appeals
1995]
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cize the wisdom of the district court's rejecting departure. Rather,
as in its pre-Guidelines practice, the Third Circuit seeks to guaran-
tee that the punishment imposed is consistent with the sentencing
scheme prescribed by Congress.123
The court of appeals' attempt to enforce the intent of Con-
gress without trammeling upon the discretion of the district court is
exemplified by United States v. Gaskill.124 In Gaskill defendant ap-
plied for a downward departure from the Guideline range applica-
ble to his conviction for fraudulent use of social security numbers
to obtain things of value. Defendant argued that departure was
warranted because his wife had suffered serious mental illness fol-
lowing the birth of their fourth child, which resulted in the loss of
her career as a businesswoman, estrangement from the children,
defendant's resignation from the presidency of a company, impov-
erishment as a result of the loss of jobs and defendant's wife's
spending sprees brought on by her manic-depressive condition,
and ultimately defendant's use of false social security numbers to
obtain credit.125 Because of his wife's affliction, defendant per-
formed all household chores and administered his wife's medica-
tion. The district court "reluctantly" denied defendant's request
to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a district court refusing departure must
expressly state on the record that it knows it has authority to depart but has de-
clined to do so. Id. The court of appeals determined that the provision of the
Sentencing Reform Act requiring the judge to "state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of the particular sentence," is met when the court indicates the ap-
plicable Guidelines range and how it was chosen. Id. at 1223 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)). The Sentencing Reform Act requires more specific statements only
where: a) a sentence is within a Guidelines range which exceeds 24 months, in
which case the court must give reasons for imposing the sentence at a particular
point within that range, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1) (1994), or b) if the sentence falls
outside the applicable guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2).
123. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3334 ("Appellate review of sentences is essential to assure that the Guidelines
are applied properly."). The same rule obtains where a defendant complains of
the extent of the trial court's downward departure. While the court will not gener-
ally accept jurisdiction over challenges to the extent of the departure, United
States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1990), the court has jurisdiction to
review appeals contending that the refusal to depart further violates the Guide-
lines. In United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992), the district
court moderated its departure for defendant's substantial assistance to the govern-
ment where the target died while the Government investigation was still in pro-
gress. Id. at 160. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction over defendant's
appeal to determine whether the Guidelines permitted the trial court to temper its
departure based upon the fruitlessness of defendant's cooperation. Id. at 160 n.2.
It held that the trial court's consideration of the usefulness of defendant's assist-
ance in assessing the amount of the departure was consistent with the Sentencing
Reform Act and the Guidelines. Id. at 161.
124. 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993).
125. Id. at 83-84.
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for a downward departure on the belief that care of a family mem-
ber is a common circumstance already taken into account by the
Guidelines.
The Third Circuit accepted jurisdiction over the appeal be-
cause the district court asserted that it lacked the authority to de-
part under the Guidelines, rather than refused to exert an
acknowledged power to depart.1 26 The court of appeals under-
stood both the Sentencing Reform Act 127 and the policy statement
in the Guidelines1 28 to ordinarily preclude reliance upon family re-
sponsibilities to support a sentence outside the Guideline range. 129
The court concluded, however, that the statute and policy state-
ment do not serve as an absolute bar to departures premised upon
family responsibilities; rather, they restrict departures to extraordi-
nary circumstances.1 3 0 It then found that the circumstances of de-
fendant's position were far from ordinary and, unlike cases where
incarceration is inevitable even with a departure, deviation from the
Guideline range could serve to preserve the family unit.
While reversing the district court's refusal to depart because of
its misapprehension of congressional intent, the Third Circuit was
careful not to invade the province of the trial judge. Rather than
mandating departure, the court remanded for resentencing, con-
cluding that "alternatives to imprisonment as well as departures
from the Guidelines are matters within the discretion of the district
126. Id. at 84.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) provides in pertinent part: "[t]he Commission shall
assure that the [G]uidelines ... reflect the general inappropriateness of consider-
ing the . . .family ties and responsibilities .. .of the defendant."
128. Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines provides: "[flamily ties and responsibili-
ties... are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be
outside the applicable [G]uideline range."
129. Gaskil4 991 F.2d at 84-85; see also United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396,
1424 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming refusal of district court to allow downward depar-
ture based upon averment that businesses owned by defendant's family would be
barred from all government contracts; "It is unfortunate that [a codefendant's]
family may suffer both personally and financially due to his conviction. However,
we see nothing extraordinary in the fact that [codefendant's] conviction may harm
not only his business interests but also those of his family members."); United
States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 121 (3d Cir.) (ruling that mere fact that defendant
regularly paid child support, and frequently spoke to and visited young son resid-
ing with his former wife is not extraordinary family tie and responsibility justifying
sentencing departure), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943 (1991).
130. Gaskill, 991 F.2d at 85. While the Gaskill court rested its analysis on the
intent of Congress, the Third Circuit did express its view that departures appropri-
ately introduce flexibility to safeguard against untoward rigidity in the Sentencing
Guidelines. The court also noted that policy statements are not subject to formal
legislative review, and thus do not have the same degree of authority as the Guide-
lines. Id. at 86 (citing Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the
Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 10-13).
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25
Gildin: Appellate Determinacy: The Sentencing Philosophy of the United St
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
court."13 1 Thus, the Third Circuit's refusal-to-departjurisprudence
displays the same elements of appellate determinacy as its pre-
Guidelines decisions.
B. Third Circuit Review of Departures from Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act assigned the courts of appeals the
potentially unrestrained role as the arbiter of the reasonableness of
departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit has
adopted the following model for review of departures:
First, we determine whether the circumstances upon
which the district court relied tojustify the departure were
adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission.
This requires a two-fold inquiry: we exercise plenary re-
view over the district court's determination that the
Guidelines do not adequately take a particular factor into
consideration, and we apply a clearly erroneous standard
of review to determine whether the facts support the sen-
tencing court's rationale. Second, we must determine
whether the sentence imposed was reasonable. This also
demands a two-fold inquiry: we consider whether the fac-
tors on which the court relied were appropriate and
whether the degree of departure was appropriate. In this
determination, we permit the district courts to exercise a
substantial amount of discretion.' 3 2
Rather than reflect an evolution in its sentencing philosophy,
each of the four prongs of the Third Circuit's test for departures
from the Sentencing Guidelines is animated by one or more of the
tenets of appellate determinacy that it consistently followed prior to
institution of the Guidelines.
131. Gaskill 991 F.2d at 86; see also Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440, 447-48 n.11 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that district court erred in believing it was not authorized to depart
downward based upon allegation that criminal history significantly over-represents
true criminal history of defendant; "The government argues forcefully that . . .
[defendant's] criminal history category does not significantly over-represent the
seriousness of his prior offenses .... We express no view on this question, leaving
it to the district court."); United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 480-81 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding that district court erred in believing it could not premise departure
on fact that defendant committed offense because of coercion or duress not
amounting to defense to crime; "Although it is not obliged to do so, the district
court has the power to depart if Klinefelter proves coercion or duress by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.").
132. United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 866 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084,
1098 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989).
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1. Were the Circumstances Justifying Departure Adequately Considered
by the Sentencing Commission?
The first part of the Third Circuit's departure methodology en-
gages the court in plenary review over whether the factors relied
upon for the departure were adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission. This initial inquiry is designed to
assure that the district court adhered to the intent of Congress.
The Sentencing Reform Act limits departures from the range pre-
scribed by the Sentencing Guidelines to cases where "the court
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission."1 3 3 Evidence of the Sentencing Com-
mission's rationale is documented by Policy Statements in the Sen-
tencing Guidelines which: a) identify certain factors that the
Commission was unable to fully take into account in promulgating
the Guidelines;13 4 b) specify certain offender characteristics as "not
ordinarily relevant" to departures; 35 and c) clarify that even where
a factor has been taken into account in the Guidelines, the trial
court may depart "if the court determines that, in light of unusual
circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor is
inadequate."1 3 6
The Third Circuit has acknowledged that the legislature cir-
cumscribed the court of appeals' power to contrive legitimate bases
for departures. Congress prescribed that "[i]n determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration
[by the Sentencing Commission], the court shall consider only the
Sentencing Guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary
of the Sentencing Commission."13 7 As a consequence, the Third
Circuit's application of the first prong of its departure tests is, as in
Tenet #1 of its pre-Guidelines practice, an endeavor to divine and
enforce the intent of Congress.138
133. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
134. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5K2.1-2.16. In Williams v. United States, 503
U.S. 193, 201 (1992), the Court held that where "a policy statement prohibits a
district court from taking a specified action, the statement is an authoritative guide
to the meaning of the applicable guideline." See also United States v. Hickman, 991
F.2d 1110, 1113 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that an upward departure based on
seriousness of past crimes was unjustified because Guidelines provided procedure
that district court failed to follow).
135. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5H1.1-1.12.
136. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5K2.0.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d
Cir. 1990).
138. See United States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
19951
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disparate impact on African-Americans is not proper ground for departure from
Guidelines range for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine); United States v.
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating fine of greater than 50 times Guide-
lines maximum based upon extraordinarily large sum of money gained and under
continual control of defendant because court's findings not supported by record);
United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535 (3d Cir.) (finding that upward departure for
more than minimal planning and more than one victim was not warranted where
Sentencing Commission appeared to have considered and rejected such out-
come), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 488 (1994); United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793,
800-01 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that downward departure based upon defendant's
mental anguish from inculpating family member affirmed because factor was to
degree not adequately considered by Sentencing Commission); United States v.
Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing upward departure in defendant's
criminal history category based on determination that some of defendant's juve-
nile convictions were previously uncounted and past adult convictions were pun-
ished too lightly because contrary to Guidelines); United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d
155, 164-65 (3d Cir.) (holding that court erred in departure based upon threat to
national security which is already subsumed in base offense level), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 93 (1992); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116 (3d Cir.) (holding that age
and lack of maturity of defendant, brief time span between offenses, and coopera-
tion with authorities were adequately taken into consideration by Sentencing Com-
mission in formulating career offender Guidelines), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943
(1991); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1307-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that disruption of governmental function not sufficiently extreme to warrant de-
parture where insignificant disruption was adequately considered by Sentencing
Commission in establishing range for offense of assaulting marshal); Kikumura,
918 F.2d at 1084 (holding that upward departure warranted where defendant's
intent to commit murder was not adequately considered by Commission in
promulgating provisions concerning criminal use of explosives); United States v.
Chiarelli, 898 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that district court erred by
using magnitude of thievery as basis for departure because Guidelines already pro-
vided for incremental levels based upon amount of property involved in crime);
United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that sentencing court
erred in determining that Sentencing Commission did not adequately consider
number of guns involved in offense and inability to trace weapons); United States
v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's determination that
Sentencing Commission had not adequately considered unusual danger of crack
cocaine as well as quality, purity and packaging of drugs).
The court of appeals has recognized that harshness of a sentence is not justifi-
cation for declining to apply the Guidelines. United States v. McClenton, 53 F.3d
584, 587 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 139 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1991). It has further held that the district court is not empowered to impose a
sentence lower than the statutory minimum absent the government's motion pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based upon defendant's substantial assistance.
United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3331 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1995) (No. 95-5661). Although the prosecutor consequently
obtains the power to determine whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence
beneath the statutory minimum, the court found that this was precisely Congress'
intent. Id. at 134.
Conversely, the court has maintained its practice of striking punishments
which exceed those prescribed by the Guidelines. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d
1318, 1330 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's order that defendant con-
victed of child pornography make substantial monetary donation to charitable
child protection organization); United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.
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2. Review of Whether the Facts Support the Sentencing Court's
Rationale
The second step in the Third Circuit's departure methodology
is the determination of whether the facts support the sentencing
court's rationale. This aspect of departure jurisprudence embraces
the second and third tenets of the court's pre-Guidelines appellate
determinacy: deference to the trial court while insisting upon pro-
cedural regularity.
In reviewing whether the announced reasons for the departure
are supported by the facts, the court of appeals applies a clearly
erroneous standard of review.139 This standard of review is ex-
pressly set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act:
[t]he court of appeals shall give due regard to the oppor-
tunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the dis-
trict court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give
due deference to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts. 140
The court of appeals has accepted that this standard mandates
deference to the sentencing court, whether it result in an upward
or downward departure. 141 Although maintaining its pre-Guide-
139. United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 866 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287
(3d Cir. 1994); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (1994). The provision that the court of appeals give
due deference to the trial judge's application of the Guidelines to the facts was
added by a 1988 Amendment to the Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7103(a) (7), 102
Stat. 4417 (Nov. 18, 1988). The purpose of this amendment is:
to give the court of appeals flexibility in reviewing an application of a
guideline standard that involves some subjectivity. The deference due a
district court's determination will depend upon the relationship of the
facts found to the guideline standard being applied. If the particular de-
termination involved closely resembles a finding of fact, the court of ap-
peals would apply a clearly erroneous test. As the determination
approaches a purely legal determination, however, the court of appeals
would review the determination more closely.
134 CONG. REc. HIl, 257 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
In Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992), the Supreme Court opined
that in establishing "limited appellate review of sentencing decisions, [the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act] did not alter a court of appeals' traditional deference to a district
court's exercise of its sentencing discretion." Id. at 205.
141. See United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
deference should be given to district court's determination that defendant's
mental anguish from inculpating his own son warranted downward departure from
Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir.)
("[i]f there is any place in the sentencing guidelines analysis where a fact-finder is
to be given considerable deference, it is here where the district court is called
19951 605
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lines acquiescence to the sentencing judge's fact-finding, the court
of appeals has interpreted the Sentencing Guidelines to increase
the procedural protections due to the defendant with respect to
fact-finding in sentencing.142 In this regard, the Third Circuit has
perpetuated its pre-Guideline insistence on procedural
regularity.1 4
The first additional procedural protection the court found en-
acted by the Guidelines heightens the requisite reliability of the in-
formation that forms the basis of the sentence.' 44 Before
institution of the Guidelines, the court of appeals merely required
that the facts underlying the sentence "have some minimal indi-
cium of reliability beyond mere allegation." 145 Although it initially
perceived the same standard to govern information used as the ba-
sis of guideline sentences,' 46 the Third Circuit later determined
upon to assess the psychological impact upon the victims"), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
970 (1991).
Deference does not signify abdication of the duty to scrutinize the record and
vacate a sentence lacking factual support for the departure. See Seale, 20 F.3d at
1289 (noting that findings relied upon to justify departure were grounded in spec-
ulation rather than fact and therefore clearly erroneous); United States v. Riviere,
924 F.2d 1289, 1307 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that trial court's factual determina-
tion of disruption of governmental functions was clearly erroneous).
142. See United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 655-56 (3d Cir.) (citing Burns v.
United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1990)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992).
143. The Supreme Court also has erected procedural protections for depar-
tures from the Sentencing Guidelines. In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129
(1990), the Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires a dis-
trict court to afford reasonable notice of its consideration of an upward departure
on grounds not identified in the presentence report or in submissions by the gov-
ernment. Id. at 129. The notice must identify with specificity the grounds on
which the court is contemplating the upward departure. Id.; accord Barr, 963 F.2d
at 655-56.
. 144. United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
Sentencing Guidelines elevate threshold of reliability for facts upon which sen-
tence is based).
145. United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982). While the
ultimate threshold of reliability was low, the court of appeals demanded that the
defendant be given the opportunity to challenge information alleged to be false.
The Sentencing Guidelines codify this mandate, requiring the trial court to give
the parties adequate opportunity to present information to the court concerning
disputed facts important to the sentencing determination as well as affording the
parties an opportunity to submit objections to the court's tentative findings of fact
before the imposition of sentence. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 6A1.3. For a further
discussion of the right of defendants to contest allegedly false information, see
supra note 58.
146. United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir.) (noting that
neither Sentencing Reform Act nor due process require different rules concerning
use of hearsay in sentencing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989). But see United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that where magni-
tude of departure is disproportionate to sentence, due process requires more than
minimal indicium of reliability; the court must examine totality of circumstances,
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that the Sentencing Guidelines pronounce a higher baseline. 147
The Third Circuit announced its heightened reliability re-
quirement in United States v. Miele.148 In Miele, defendant's base of-
fense level was premised upon the court's finding that Miele
conspired to distribute cocaine in an amount in excess of five kilo-
grams. 149 The volume of cocaine was ascertained from information
provided by an informant who was a drug addict and whose esti-
mate provided to the probation officer greatly exceeded the quan-
tity of drugs he testified to at trial.' 50 In assessing whether the
informant's testimony supported the trial court's conclusion as to
the amount of drugs involved, the Third Circuit held that the Sen-
tencing Guidelines elevate the threshold of reliability for facts upon
which a sentencing determination is based.' 5 ' Section 6A1.3(a) of
the Guidelines provides that while information considered in sen-
tencing need not be admissible under the rules of evidence gov-
erning the trial, the information relied upon must have "sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." 152 The Com-
mentary to section 6A1.3 makes plain that unlike the pre-Guide-
lines practice, characteristics of the particular offense and offender
will have a specific and measurable effect on the sentence under
the Guidelines. 153 Consequently, the court reasoned that "the relia-
bility of the evidentiary basis for facts found at sentencing is of the
utmost importance."''
54
Interestingly, while proclaiming a more rigorous evidentiary
standard in Miele, the court of appeals maintained its posture of
including other corroborating evidence, to determine whether hearsay declara-
tions are reasonably trustworthy).
147. Miele, 989 F.2d at 663.
148. 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993).
149. Id. at 662.
150. Id. at 661-62.
151. Id. at 663-64.
152. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 6A1.3(a).
153. Id. § 6A1.3 cmt. Although the commentary to the Guidelines is not au-
thorized by the Sentencing Reform Act, the Supreme Court has found commen-
tary that interprets or explains a guideline to be authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993);
see also United States v. Hightower, 25 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir.) ("[W]e think that the
commentary's expansion of the definition of a controlled substance offense ...
does not 'violate[ ] the Constitution or a federal statute.' " (quoting Stinson, 113 S.
Ct. at 1915), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 370 (1994).
154. Miele, 989 F.2d at 668; see also United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1216
(3d Cir.) (ruling that promotional pamphlet does not provide sufficiently reliable
basis for concluding that Phaser Mace is dangerous weapon within meaning of
Guidelines), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1806 (1995).
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deference to the district court.155 The court did not preclude the
district court from ultimately relying upon the informant's post-trial
statements to the probation officer to establish the quantity of co-
caine. 156 Instead, it remanded for resentencing. The Third Circuit
provided, however, that should the trial court elect to accept the
informant's estimate, it must make specific, non-conclusory find-
ings of fact explaining why it deemed the informant's post-trial esti-
mate to have sufficient indicia of reliability to support a conclusion
that it is probably accurate in the face of: a) inconsistent trial testi-
mony, and b) the informant's status as a drug addict.15 7
The second procedural protection which the court of appeals
erected under the Sentencing Guidelines is the loftier standard of
proof to be applied in cases of extreme departures from the Guide-
lines. In United States v. Kikumura,158 defendant was convicted of
passport and explosives offenses carrying a Guidelines sentencing
range of between twenty-seven and thirty-three months in prison. 159
Departing upward from the Guidelines range, the trial judge sen-
tenced Kikumura to thirty years imprisonment because evidence at
the sentencing hearing indicated that Kikumura manufactured
three bombs in preparation for a major terrorist attack at a Navy
and Marine recruiting office in New York City with the intent to
cause multiple deaths and serious injuries.1 60
In reviewing the challenge to the sentencing judge's finding
that Kikumura intended to use the bombs to kill people, the court
of appeals first addressed the appropriate standard of proof appli-
cable to sentencing hearings.161 In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,162 the
Supreme Court had held that while proof of guilt must be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt, most sentencing facts need be
proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. 163 The Third Cir-
cuit assented to that standard as appropriate in most sentencing
cases under the Guidelines.1 64 However, the court held that facts
155. Miele, 989 F.2d at 664-65.
156. Id. at 664.
157. Id. at 665. The Court held that "[t]he absence of any findings by the
court to explain why it may have chosen to follow [the witness' higher estimate]
... leaves us without confidence that [there was] 'sufficient indicia of reliability.'"
Id.
158. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1089.
160. Id. at 1093-98.
161. Id. at 1098-1102.
162. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
163. Id. at 91.
164. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101-02.
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must be proven by clear and convincing evidence for departures so
great that the sentencing hearing could be characterized as "a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense." 165
The court's decision to increase the burden of proof in cases of
extreme departure was not motivated by a desire to enhance its
power to invade the fact findings of the trial judge.166 Indeed, the
court of appeals ultimately found that the trial court's determina-
tion that Kikumura intended to kill was supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence in the record. 167 The court was impelled by due
process concerns raised by the Guidelines scheme of assigning pun-
ishment based upon the defendant's actual conduct in the particu-
lar case. In cases of modest departures from the Guideline range,
the sentencing decision is less crucial than the determination of
guilt, thus justifying the use of a preponderance standard to allevi-
ate the fiscal and administrative burdens of a more onerous stan-
dard. 168 Where a significant departure from the Guidelines is
contemplated, however, the sentencing hearing will have far
greater consequences for the defendant than the underlying con-
viction. In such instances, the court held, the defendant must be
afforded procedural protections more closely akin to those guaran-
teed at trial, including the requirement that the facts underlying
the departure be established at least by clear and convincing
evidence.169
165. Id. at 1101 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986));
see United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1288-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that seven-
fold upward departure from maximum fine prescribed by Guidelines is type of
"extreme context" mandating clear and convincing standard of proof; preponder-
ance of evidence standard, however, governs departure assessing double maximum
fine against co-defendant).
166. Of course, the net result of increasing the burden of proof is a concomi-
tant expansion of situations where the court of appeals will find the sentencing
court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous. See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d
1384, 1410-11 (3d Cir. 1994) (ruling that district court finding that defendant hid
seven million dollars in illegal profits in foreign bank accounts, relied upon to
support upward departure in excess of 50 times Guideline range fine, might be
affirmed under preponderance standard but is clearly erroneous under governing
clear and convincing evidence standard).
167. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104.
168. The defendant's entitlement to procedural protections is also weakened
as he is no longer cloaked with the presumption of innocence. Bertoli, 40 F.3d at
1409.
169. While not signifying an effort to invade the discretion of the trial judge,
at first blush the Kikumura court could be accused of usurping the province of the
legislature. The court, however, believed the clear and convincing standard im-
plicit in the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) that in order to justify a depar-
ture, the trial judge must "find" an aggravating or mitigating circumstance not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. Kikumura,
918 F.2d at 1102.
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It is not surprising that the Third Circuit obeyed its pre-Guide-
lines tenets in applying the first two parts of its departure methodol-
ogy. The first step squarely called upon the court to interpret and
enforce the intent of the legislature. The second inquiry involved
the court in review of fact-finding comparable to the review of dis-
cretion in which it had engaged before the Guidelines, albeit within
a quite different overall sentencing scheme. Yet, the final two
stages of the departure analysis directly instruct the court of appeals
to evaluate the reasonableness of the departure, thus presenting
the court with an avenue to interject its own sentencing philosophy.
The Third Circuit, however, expressly declined the invitation to
thrust its own view of sentencing policy upon the district courts. 170
3. Appropriateness of the Factors Relied Upon for the Departure
The third prong of the departure methodology requires the
court of appeals to ascertain whether the factors on which the sen-
tencing court relied - factors which, under the first step of the
analysis, the appellate court already would have concluded were not
adequately considered in the Guidelines - are "appropriate bases
for departure from the guideline range." 171 While the court deci-
sions applying this test are relatively sparse, the opinions exhibit a
jurisprudence consistent with appellate determinacy. First, as in
the pre-Guidelines era, the court of appeals has recognized that the
district court is owed "a substantial amount of discretion" in deter-
mining whether the factor relied upon for the departure is appro-
priate. 172 Second, the court of appeals has promoted the
sentencing scheme crafted by Congress and the Sentencing Com-
mission by analogizing to the Sentencing Guidelines in determin-
ing appropriateness.
In certain cases, the factors relied upon to depart are specified
in the Guidelines as proper bases for an upward or downward de-
parture. 173 In such instances, the court of appeals obviously has no
occasion to interject its view as to the appropriateness of the factor
used for the departure. 74 Yet, even where the Guidelines do not
170. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's philosophy on imposing
its views of sentencing policy upon district courts, see supra notes 132-69 and ac-
companying text.
171. United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 866 (3d Cir. 1995).
172. Id.; see also United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989)
("[T] he district courts are entitled to exercise a substantial amount of discretion in
determining whether to depart from the guidelines.").
173. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, §§ 5K1.1-5K2.16.
174. United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (3d Cir.) (noting that
[Vol. 40: p. 577
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identify the factor as appropriate for departure, rather than gener-
ate its own philosophy of appropriateness, the court of appeals has
examined whether the factor is employed by related provisions of
the Guidelines not directly controlling the offense or departure. In
United States v. Ryan,175 the court upheld the district court's reliance
upon the quantity and purity of the drugs involved to justify an up-
ward departure in defendant's sentence for simple possession of a
controlled substance. 176 In finding these to be appropriate
grounds for departure, the court noted that the Guidelines ex-
pressly include quantity as a relevant sentencing element for other
drug related offenses and indirectly incorporate the purity of drugs
into base offense levels. 177 Similarly, in United States v. Cheny,17s the
court held the factors set forth in the Guidelines on obstruction of
justice to be an appropriate foundation for departure following de-
fendant's conviction for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution, an
offense for which there was no Sentencing Guideline.1 79 In United
States v. Felton,80 the fact that defendant tax examiner accepted
multiple gratuities to adjust tax liabilities was deemed an appropri-
ate circumstance for departure because analogous Guidelines au-
thorized increased penalties for public officials who accepted
multiple bribes. 181 As these cases evidence, rather than proffer' its
own criteria for sentencing departures, the court of appeals has ex-
trapolated from the factors deemed relevant by Congress and the
upward departure for inflicting extreme psychological injury on victims approved
by Guidelines § 5K2.3), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 970 (1991).
175. 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989).
176. Id. at 606-08. The court also affirmed the sentencing judge's reliance on
the packaging of drugs as a departure factor, rejecting defendant's claim that use
of this fact was precluded because he had been acquitted of possession with intent
to distribute. Id. at 609. The court reasoned that, as in the pre-Guidelines era,
sentencing judges may consider conduct that is not an element of the offense for
which the defendant was convicted. Id.
177. The Ryan court relied upon the following policy statement in § 5K2.0 of
the Guidelines to deem appropriate factors listed in other provisions of the Guide-
lines: "[A] factor may be listed as.a specific offense characteristic under one guide-
line but not under all guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not mean
that there may not be circumstances when that factor would be relevant to sentenc-
ing." Ryan, 866 F.2d at 607 (quoting U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5K2.0).
178. 10 F.3d 1003 (3d Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 1009-10. The court also held, however, that the district court erred
by departing upward based upon the Guideline pertaining to an "Official Victim,"
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2, and the Guideline on Criminal Purpose, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9, find-
ing that the facts of the case did not meet the criteria of these Guidelines. Id. at
1010-12. In so ruling, the court did not reject the use of analogous Guidelines as
appropriate factors for departure. Id. at 1012-13.
180. 55 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1995).
181. Id. at 868.
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Sentencing Commission in analogous circumstances.18 2
In sum, while expressing that to be appropriate for departure a
factor "must be relevant to the defendant's culpability,"183 the court
has looked to the Guidelines rather than the court's own construct
to define what is relevant. While the court has not detailed the
policy reasons underlying its refusal to implement its own philoso-
phy in defining the appropriateness of the factors giving rise to the
departure, it has overtly repudiated a more activist role in assessing
the reasonableness of the degree of the departure.
4. Appropriateness of the Degree of Departure
The Third Circuit's most conscious declination of the opportu-
nity to apply its own sentencing philosophy through reviewing the
reasonableness of departures lies in the final stage of its departure
- analysis - evaluation of whether the degree of departure is appro-
priate. The court in United States v. Kikumura,184 explicated the ra-
tionale for perpetuating its pre-Guidelines deference to the trial
court and legislature when scrutinizing the degree of the
departure. 18 5
The court of appeals submitted that legislative intent, as well'as
preserving the structural integrity of the judiciary, countenance a
deferential standard of review of the appropriateness of the degree
of the departure. District courts are to be afforded " 'a substantial
182. Cf. United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that
where Guideline already considers potential harm of crime, court cannot depart
upward by analogy to another crime involving same potential harm), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 93 (1992). The one prominent exception to this approach is found in
United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 1993). In Schweitzer, the trial judge
imposed an upward departure to defendant's sentence following his conviction for
conspiracy to bribe a public official in order to acquire confidential information
held by the Social Security Administration. Id. The departure was founded in part
upon defendant's disclosure of his compromise of confidential information in ap-
pearances on the Oprah Winfrey show and other interviews, which the court be-
lieved enhanced the loss of public confidence caused by the bribery. Id. at 46-47.
Without citation to the Guidelines or any other authority, the court of appeals
held that it was inappropriate for the judge to take into account defendant's media
efforts to call attention to the ease of obtaining confidential information held by
the government, a matter of public concern. Id. at 48. Although not expressed by
the court, arguably, utilization of defendant's media appearances as a departure
factor could raise first amendment concerns.
The court of appeals likewise offered no reason for its conclusion in United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), that defendant's intent to com-
mit murder was "an eminently reasonable basis" for an upward departure from his
conviction for explosives offenses, although the' correctness of its conclusion seems
self-evident as a matter of common sense. Id. at 1110.
183. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d at 48.
184. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
185. Id. at 1110-14.
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amount of discretion' in determining the extent of any depar-
ture."186 The court found such deference mandated by the legisla-
tive instruction that the court of appeals must affirm unless the
sentence was: (1) imposed in violation of law; (2) imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines; or (3) outside
the Guideline range and unreasonable. 18 7
The court of appeals further offered that special deference is
owed to the trial court at this level of the analysis because, through
the first three stages of the departure methodology, the court al-
ready would have ascertained that the sentence was not offensive to
the Guidelines. At this juncture, therefore, the remaining issue is
whether the judgment of the court of appeals should displace the
discretion of the trial court. Because the " '[d]istrict courts are in
the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-blood defendants,' " whereas
the court of appeals is relegated to " 'the antiseptic nature of a ster-
ile paper record,' " the Third Circuit opined that deference was
owed not only because of Congress' instruction, but due to the trial
judge's " 'superior "feel" for the case.' "188
Although endorsing the wisdom of yielding to the trial judge's
discretion, the court of appeals did not entirely abandon a role in
determining the reasonableness of departures. 189 It posited that
objective standards must govern the statutory requirement of rea-
sonableness.' 90 In defining these objective standards, however, the
court patently accepted the primacy of the legislature in matters of
sentencing.191
The court of appeals began its search for standards pertaining
to the reasonableness requirement by acknowledging that neither
pre-Guidelines statutes nor common law offered any guidance, as
the discretionary judgments of trial courts before institution of the
186. Id. at 1110 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.
1989)).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0(3) (1994); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110.
188. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110 (quoting United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874
F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989)).
189. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110-14.
190. Id. at 1110-11. The court argued that the Sentencing Guidelines were
adopted to avoid disparity in sentencing that results from reasonable persons dif-
fering over what is an appropriate sentence. Id. at 1110. It believed "that fidelity
to the policy undergirding the guidelines requires (the court] . . . to strive for
some principled basis for reviewing the reasonableness of departures." Id. at 1110-
11. If there were no objective standards, then sentencing disparity would reap-
pear. Id. at 1111.
191. Id. at 1111 ("A natural starting point for deriving such standards is the
statutory provision governing appellate review.").
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Guidelines were "essentially unreviewable."' 192 The Third Circuit
also found the Sentencing Reform Act particularly unhelpful in di-
vining a principled basis to measure the reasonableness of depar-
tures.193 One guidepost offered by the Sentencing Reform Act was
that in assessing reasonableness, the court of appeals must look at
"the factors to be considered [by the district court] in imposing a
sentence, as set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]."1 94 Section 3553(a)
in turn requires the district court to craft a sentence "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary" to comply with the four purposes of
sentencing: retribution, general deterrence, specific deterrence
and a measure of rehabilitation. 195 Without doing violence to the
statute, the Third Circuit could have seized upon the language of
the statute to contrive its own recipe for balancing the core aims of
sentencing. Instead, the court spurned the role of oracle of reason-
ableness, finding that without further legislative guidance as to how
to weight the often conflicting goals of sentencing in a particular
case, the general sentencing policies listed in § 3553(a) could not
supply a principled basis to prevent disparities in sentencing. 196
Having refused to measure reasonableness by its own "hunches
and instincts," 197 the court of appeals instructed the district courts
to attempt to analogize to related Guidelines in measuring the de-
gree of a departure.198 The court found authority for this approach
in the Sentencing Reform Act, which provides that in imposing a
sentence for an offense with no governing guideline, the court
must have "due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed
to sentences prescribed by Guidelines applicable to similar offenses
and offenders."' 99 The Guidelines also endorse analogization
192. Id. at 1110.
193. Id. at 1111. The court noted that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(e)(3)(B) and
3553(c) provide little more than "that if a district court fails to state the specific
findings on which its departure is based, the court of appeals should vacate and
remand for clarification." Id.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3) (1994).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994).
196. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1111. Specifically, the court complained that:
The statute says nothing about how much of each factor [§ 3553(a)] re-
quires, how to determine the amount of each factor a contemplated sen-
tence in fact would provide, or how to weigh factors against one another
in the frequent situations when different factors (for example, retribu-
tion and rehabilitation) tend to pull in opposing directions.
Id. Rather than taking an activist position, the court allowed analogic reasoning
and afforded the district court deference to "craft any particular analogy [to other
Guidelines criteria] it might wish to employ." Id. at 1114.
197. Id. at 1113-14.
198. Id.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The Third Circuit has held that the meth-
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where the defendant's criminal history understates the seriousness
of the past criminal conduct or likelihood of recurrence; in depart-
ing on this basis, the court is to "use, as a reference, the guideline
range for a defendant with a higher or lower criminal history cate-
gory."200 The Third Circuit adopted as a guiding principle that
"the appropriate length of a sentence should be determined from
the sentencing table, even outside the context of straightforward
applications of [the] ... guidelines. '" 20 1 By directing the district
courts to follow by analogy the structure of the Guidelines, the
court of appeals hoped to forestall the disparity in sentences that
motivated passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, disparity that
would be inevitable under a standardless approach to reasonable-
ness. The Third Circuit tailored its methodology, then, to carry out
the will of Congress at the expense of its own power to influence
sentencing policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's fidelity to the three tenets of appellate de-
terminacy is in the highest tradition of the classical role of federal
appellate courts. The court's reversal of all sentences violative of
the statutory scheme, regardless of the court's sympathy with the
reasons for departure, accepts that the role of the court of appeals
is not to quarrel with the legislature's judgment within constitu-
odology developed in Kikumura likewise governs sentencing and departures where
no offense guideline exists. United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1012-13 (3d Cir.
1993).
200. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 4A1.3; United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206,
1211-14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1806 (1995).
201. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1112. The court found that enhancement of
Kikumura's sentence could be justified under analogous Guidelines sanctioning
upward departures for criminal history, multiple attempted murders, extreme con-
duct and conduct endangering public safety. The court then ruled that the Guide-
line authorizing upward departure for disruption of governmental functions was
not analogous because Kikumura's intent to modify government policy by deter-
ring future anti-terrorist bombings akin to the bombing of Libya was not disrup-
tion of a governmental function within the meaning of the Guidelines. Applying
the analogous Guideline departures, the applicable sentencing range would be
210 to 262 months. Because the trial judge's sentence of 360 months imprison-
ment exceeded the analogous Guideline range, the court of appeals remanded for
resentencing.
On remand, the district court sentenced Kikumura to 262 months imprison-
ment. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting Kikumura's claim that
the trial judge deprived him of his right to counsel by refusing to grant a continu-
ance to obtain counsel of his choice. United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
degree of departure for accepting multiple gratuities appropriate because it was
no greater than sentence required by analogous Guideline).
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tional bounds but to enforce its intent. The court defers to Con-
gress' greater ability to hold hearings to assess and balance the
difficult policy judgments encompassed within sentencing, as well
as its position as the democratically elected representatives of the
public will. The Third Circuit's reversal of sentences tainted by pro-
cedural error is the basic execution of the judicial branch's duty to
interpret the Constitution, in particular the requirement that no
person be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Finally,
the Third Circuit's refusal to upset the exercise of the sentencing
court's discretion is emblematic of a court of appeals' general def-
erence to findings of fact, as the trial court has superior informa-
tion by virtue of its ability to observe the witnesses who testify. With
respect to sentencing, as the Third Circuit noted in Del Piano v.
United States,202 the district court judge has
the opportunity to evaluate the total person who stands at
the bar of justice: to note the physical appearance and
demeanor; the tone, temper and rhythm of speech; the
facial expressions, the hands, the revealing look into the
eyes . . . those impressions gleaned through the senses in
any personal confrontation in which one attempts to as-
sess the credibility or to evaluate the true moral fiber of
another.
Wide discretion is vested in the sentencing judge be-
cause of what is called "the superiority of his nether posi-
tion." This is so not because the districtjudge knows more
than his appellate brothers, but rather, as Professor Mau-
rice Rosenberg reminds us, "he sees more and senses
more."
203
But what about justice? In an arena so rife with controversy
and emotion, why has there not been a case in which the court's
sensibilities were so offended that it dropped its deferential posture
in favor of what it believed to be the proper sentence for the de-
fendant at bar? Professor Linder has castigated the courts of ap-
peals' inflexible interpretation of the Guidelines and declination to
review refusals to depart as symptomatic of "[d]istance from the
human consequences of one's decisions [that] can breed the indif-
ference and lack of imagination that Hannah Arendt found so
202. 575 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
203. Id. at 1069.
[Vol. 40: p. 577
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closely linked to evil."'20 4 Judge Cabranes commends replacement
of the Sentencing Guidelines with a system of enhanced appellate
review of discretion as "a way to preserve the humanity of the sen-
tencing system while preventing potential 'disparities' from eroding
the principle that, all other things being equal, similar crimes
should entail similar punishments."20 5 Yet, as the pendulum of sen-
tencing philosophy has swung between retribution and rehabilita-
tion, determinacy and indeterminacy, the Third Circuit has
abnegated rather than arrogated the power to define sentencing
policy. The court has taken to heart the admonition it issued to the
district courts to "refrain from taking into consideration factors that
are adverse to the philosophy of [the sentencing scheme estab-
lished by Congress], which is now the law of the land, whether the
... court philosophically agrees or disagrees with it."2°6
Perhaps the true, but unarficulated, source of the Third Cir-
cuit's appellate determinacy is its belief that courts of appeals are
not competent to implement a philosophy that balances the aims of
punishment through articulable rules which can successfully ad-
dress the root problems of crime. Professor Lawrence Friedman, in
his epic work Crime and Punishment in American History, concludes
that crime is "embedded in the culture" and cannot be eradicated
by punishment.20 7 The evolution of sentencing philosophy in the
United States is but a microcosm of the thousands of years old "fun-
damental jurisprudential conflict.., over whether what is 'right'
(deserved punishment) is good or whether what is 'good' (the utili-
tarian, crime control aims of deterrence, incapacitation, and treat-
ment) is right."208 Although impotent to resolve this conflict, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has sought to
ensure that within parameters established by Congress and the facts
as determined by the district court, the ultimate sentence, even if
not just, is fair.
204. Douglas Linder, Journeying Through the Valley of Evi4 71 N.C. L. REv. 1111,
1147 (1993).
205. Cabranes, supra note 12, at 188. Judge Cabranes would require the trial
judge to explain on the record the rationale for the sentence, with both the gov-
ernment and the defendant at liberty to appeal the outcome. Id. The appellate
courts then would develop common-law standards for sentencing as they do in
other areas of the law. Id. at 185-89.
206. United States v. Chiarelli, 898 F.2d 373, 385 (3d Cir. 1990).
207. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 456-63.
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Docket # Caption Date Dock Date Term
both 94-7306 USA v. Gilbert MO 05/27/94 02/08/95
sen 94-7321 USA v. Brissett MO 06/01/94 12/22/94
sen 94-7384 USA v. Courts MO 07/06/94 12/22/94
sen 94-7388 USA v. Akala JO 07/07/94 02/13/95
both 94-7419 USA v. Heffley MO 07/19/94 12/16/94
sen 94-7430 USA v. Griffin JO 07/26/94 02/08/95
both 94-7431 USA v. Green MO 07/26/94 01/30/95
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APPENDIX B
THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL & CIVIL STATISTICS 1940-1993
Year Criminal Civil Total % of total
1993 582 2338 2920 20 80
1992 495 2299 2794 18 82
1991 514 2147 2661 19 81
1990 469 2149 2618 18 82
1989 455 2197 2652 17 83
1988 430 2241 2671 16 84
1987 343 1922 2265 15 85
1986 341 1906 2247 15 85
1985 333 1978 2311 14 86
1984 429 1775 2204 19 81
1983 369 1722 2091 18 82
1982 311 1565 1876 17 83
1981 299 1203 1502 20 80
1980 291 1189 1480 20 80
1979 313 1090 1403 22 78
1978 352 976 1328 27 73
1977 407 1047 1454 28 72
1976 323 1004 1327 24 76
1975 321 812 1133 28 72
1974 299 917 1216 25 75
1973 314 967 1281 25 75
1972 305 896 1201 25 75
1971 134 971 1105 12 88
1970 85 615 700 12 88
1969 62 534 596 10 90
1968 72 633 705 10 90
1967 74 504 578 13 87
1966 60 478 538 11 89
1965 25 218 243 10 90
1964 24 251 275 9 91
1963 17 195 212 8 92
1962 92 295 387 24 76
1961 37 272 309 12 88
1960 30 264 294 10 90
1959 35 260 295 12 88
1958 53 262 315 17 83
1957 29 255 284 10 90
1956 35 243 278 13 87
1955 30 235 265 11 89
1954 26 247 273 10 90
1953 22 274 296 7 93
1952 25 254 279 9 91
1951 16 248 264 6 94
1950 25 279 304 8 92
1949 28 259 287 10 90
1948 26 224 250 10 90
1947 26 190 216 12 88
1946 47 227 274 17 83
1945 36 232 268 13 87
1944 21 283 304 7 93
1943 22 280 302 7 93
1942 32 190 222 14 86
1941 27 323 350 8 92
1940 32 328 360 9 91
TOTALS 9,600 44,663 54,263 18% 82%
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